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Abstract:  
 
Basic usage of principles-based, fair value and full disclosure at IFRS is expected to have a 
positive impact, resulting in improving quality of accounting information to be capable of 
reflecting the current economic condition of the company. Thus, it can increase the value 
relevance, which will decrease the information asymmetry between management and users of 
financial statements.  
This study examines how the intensity of management in earnings management, how the 
earnings quality before and after the implementation of IFRS and whether earnings 
management affects the earnings quality. The results revealed that the intensity of 
management in  earnings management is higher when it is compared to the one after the 
implementation of IFRS, by looking at the amount of discreationary accrual.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that the implementation of IFRS can reduce the intensity of 
corporate management activity  in earnings management. The results of subsequent research 
states that earnings management after the implementation of IFRS effect on the earnings 
quality was proxied with earnings persistence. The next finding is that the quality of 
corporate earnings after IFRS implementation is higher when compared to earnings quality 
prior to IFRS implementation. 
 
Keywords: earnings quality, earnings management, earnings persistence and value 
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1. Introduction 
 
Relevance and reliability of financial information determine the quality of financial 
reporting that needs qualified financial accounting standard.  Qualified accounting 
standard covers comprehensive principles that are neutral, consistent, appealing 
power, relevant, and reliable, is needed by investors, creditors, and other parties to 
make business decision.  The demand on qualified financial accounting standard 
leads to International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) adoption.  The adoption 
of IFRS into Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) in Indonesia aims to produce 
financial report that has high level of credibility and accountability, able to fulfill the 
requirement on disclosure items that are higher, so it increases the firm’s value.  It is 
meant for company to be able to present financial information more relevantly and 
accurately, and can be compared more related to asset, debt, equity, earnings, and 
expenses of company.   
 
The process of IFRS convergence into FAS in Indonesia is implemented through 
three stages.  First is adoption stage in 2008 – 2011 which is the adopting stage of all 
IFRS into FAS, infrastructure preparation needed, as well as evaluation and 
management of the impact from IFRS adoption on applicable FAS. Second is final 
preparation stage in 2011 which is the completion stage of infrastructure needed to 
implement FAS that has adopted all IFRS.  Third is implementation stage in 2012 
which is the first implementation stage of FAS that has adopted all IFRS and 
evaluating comprehensively on the impact from the FAS implementation.  Starting 
on 1st January 2012, financial reports of all companies listed on Indonesia Stock 
Exchange must be set based on Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) the has 
adopted IFRS fully.  
 
IFRS has 3 fundamental characteristics which are principles-based, fair value, and 
full disclosure.  The use of principle-based in IFRS has advantage in the form of 
ability to avoid agreement making or transaction following disclosure principle.  The 
use of fair value on IFRS will produce accounting information that reflects more the 
present economic condition of company, so it can increase value relevance from the 
information produced. Meanwhile, full disclosure requires management to make 
more disclosures in finacial report presented on all information owned and known. 
Therefore, information users have wider opportunity to obtain and consider relevant 
information that must be known related to decision making. Thus, IFRS 
implementation will reduce information asymmetry between management and 
financial report user.   
 
The studies about the effect of IFRS about the effect of IFRS implementation have 
been conducted with varied results. The study done by Armstrong et al. (2010) 
related to market reaction after IFRS adoption in Europe, found the result that there 
are positive reactions from investors toward companies that have implemented IFRS 
that can be seen from the increase of information quality, so it increases capital 
allocation more efficiently.  Moreover, Loureiro and Taboada (2012) conducted a 
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study about the effect of IFRS adoption both mandatorily and voluntarily on share 
rate information. Share rate information can be seen from the side of corporate 
environment that is more transparent, better investor protection, and lower 
information cost (Morck et al., 2000).  
 
According to Chen et al. (2010), IFRS implementation has the impact of increasing 
accounting quality (including earnings quality), reducing earnings manipulating 
activity, lower amount of accrual discretion absolute value, and higher tendency of 
accrual quality.  Meanwhile, Ball (2006) stated the impact of IFRS implementation 
still must be documented whether it really brings the actual change toward earnings 
quality or only uniformity of standard.   
 
The aim of FAS implementation that has adopted IFRS is to increase the relevance 
and reliability of information presented in financial report to be useful for users as 
the base of business decision making. To manifest the expediency, IFRS must be the 
foundation to present financial information in accordance with the real condition and 
contains all disclosures needed, so the users have the right foundation in evaluating 
corporate performance.  Therefore, the implementation IFRS should limit the actions 
of management to conduct earnings management. It is because management is 
limited by IFRS implementation that has fundamental criteria of fair value in 
measuring assets, liabilities and equities, ad full disclosure. It means that IFRS 
implementation will reduce the intensity of management in conducting earnings 
management.  
 
Regarding to financial information making, a main motivation of management in 
conducting earnings management is opportunistic purpose, which is an earnings 
management action by elevating earnings to increase the amount of compensation or 
bonus that will be received. Although the study done by Farichah (2017) 
demonstrated the result that compensation negatively relates to earnings 
management, the compensation is designed by considering justice element, so the 
compensation will reduce management motivation to conduct earnings management 
with opportunistic purpose.  
 
Opportunistic purpose tends to disserve financial report users because information 
delivered by management becomes not accurate and does not describe fundamental 
value of company (Beneish, 2001), and will be responded negatively by investors.  
However, there is another motivation from management to conduct earnings 
management, which is efficient contract purpose.  Based on efficient contract 
purposes, this motivation encourages management to conduct earnings management 
with the purpose of increasing firm’s value, by presenting financial information in 
accordance with the actual condition, based on fair value, so information announced 
will be responded positively by financial report users.  Efficient contract motivation 
is expected to give impact on the increase of share rate that will give impact on the 
increase of return of shares received by shareholders. 
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1.1 Problem Formulation 
 
Based on the background explained above, the research problems are formulated as 
follows:  
1. Is there a significant difference between management intensity in 
conducting earnings management before and after IFRS implementation 
in Indonesia?  
2. Is there an impact of earnings management on earnings quality before 
and after IFRS implementation in Indonesia?  
3. Is there a significant difference between earnings quality before and 
after IFRS implementation in Indonesia?  
 
2.   Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
 
Some theories, such as agency theory and signaling theory, that underlie the 
relationship between IFRS implementation and management intensity to conduct 
earnings management and its relationship with earnings quality, as well as how the 
difference between management intensity in conducting earnings management, and 
between earnings quality before and after IFRS implementation, will be explained in 
the explanation below. 
  
2.1 Agency Theory  
 
Agency theory explains the agency relationship from a contract between principal 
and agent that basically contains the interest separation between both parties, which 
often create problem when each party has different goal.  Agency theory will solve 
the problem emerging in agency relationship (Scott, 2009). The first problem is 
when the desire or the purpose of owner and agent is contradictive (different), and 
the second problem is the presence of difficulty and expensive cost for owner to 
conduct verification of what really has been done by agent.  One assumption 
explained by agency theory is the presence of information difference owned by 
principal and agent that can be equated with the relationship between company and 
the owner of the company.  
 
2.2 Signaling Theory  
 
Signaling theory assumes that there is information asymmetry between manager and 
owner or shareholder of company.  Manager is viewed to have information about 
company (inside information) that is not owned by shareholder.  Signaling theory 
explains the reason of importance for company to present information to public 
(Wolk et al., 2006). The information can be in the form of financial report, corporate 
policy information, or other information that is disclosed voluntarily by company’s 
management.  Signaling theory states on how a company should give information 
signals to its users.  Signal can be in the form of information about what has been 
done by management to manifest the desire of the owner.  Therefore, manager tries 
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to give information, among other by using earnings numbers.  Earnings quality will 
affect the quality shareholder’s decision. 
  
2.3 IFRS Implementation   
 
The development globally in all sectors requires the presence of financial reporting 
standard that can fulfill the needs of information users in economic decision making.  
Accounting information that is useful for users is relevant and reliable information.  
To fulfill the requirement of relevant and reliable information availability, a 
financial reporting standard that can produce information that can be compared 
internationally is applied (Thalassinos and Liapis, 2014; Suryanto and Thalassinos, 
2017).  The standard is known as International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS).  More than 100 countries have adopted IFRS.  IFRS implementation is 
based on the expectation that the quality of information presented in financial report 
should be increasing.  Some studies that have been conducted to investigate the 
advantage from the adoption of IFRS, and its effect on accounting information 
quality, have concluded a result that there is increase on value relevance on reported 
information (Bartov et al., 2005, and Barth et al., 2007; Liapis and Thalassinos, 
2013; Thalassinos et al., 2012). 
  
2.4 Earnings Management  
 
Earnings management is accounting policy selection by manager from existing 
accounting standard and naturally can maximize their utility and or corporate market 
value.  According to Scott (2009), earnings management be: 1) opportunistic 
behavior from manager to maximize his/her utility in facing compensation contract, 
debt contract, and political cost (Opportunistic Earnings Management); 2) 
perspective of efficient contracting (Efficient Earnings Management), where 
earnings management gives manager a flexibility to protect themselves and 
company in anticipating unpredicted events for the benefit of the parties involving in 
the contract.   
 
Until now, earnings management has not been defined accurately and applied in 
general.  Although Dechow and Skinner (2000) mentioned two definitions that have 
been able to be accepted widely, which is earnings management is an intervention 
that is deliberately done with certain purpose toward external financial reporting 
process to obtain some personal benefit. According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), 
earnings management occurs when managers use their consideration in financial 
reporting and transaction making to change financial report with the misleading 
purpose toward shareholder based on organization’s economic performance or to 
affect the result in accordance with the contract that depends on the reported 
accounting numbers. 
  
2.5 Earnings Quality  
 
  F. Farichah   
 
75  
 
 Earnings quality very determines decision that will be taken by shareholder related 
to the company.  The size used in evaluating whether the quality of earnings is high 
or low, one of them is earnings persistence. Persistent earnings are earnings that can 
reflect the sustainability of earnings (sustainable earnings) in the future that is 
determined by accrual components and their cash flows.  Earnings persistence is an 
earnings revision that is expected in the future reflected from running year earnings.  
Therefore, earnings persistence can be used as future earnings indicator. Sustainable 
earnings persistence is stated as earnings that have high quality; in the contrary, if 
unusual earnings are stated as earnings that have poor quality (Penman and Zhang, 
2002). More persistent earnings show more informative earnings; in the contrary, if 
earnings are less persistent, earnings become less informative (Tucker and Zarowin, 
2006). Earnings persistence is as one measurement of earnings quality by seeing the 
slope coefficient of current earnings regression on lagged earnings. 
   
2.6 Earnings Management Before and After IFRS Implementation  
 
IFRS implementation is done with the aim to give the base of financial report 
making that presents relevant and reliable information.  For accounting information 
(including earnings information) to be relevant and reliable, it must be made based 
on principles-based, fair value, and full disclosure. Therefore, IFRS implementation 
will have effect on information provision that gives protection on investor in 
economic decision making.  
 
Because the process of financial report making is based on principles-based, fair 
value, and full disclosure, management has space in earnings modification that is 
narrower, so it limits management intensity to present financial report that is 
misleading and disadvantageous for investors or other considered parties with 
corporate financial information.  Based on the explanation, hypothesis of this study 
is formulated as the following: 
  
H1: Intensity of corporate management in conducting earnings management after 
IFRS implementation is lower than before IFRS implementation. 
   
2.7 The Relationship between Earnings Management and Earnings Quality  
 
There are two perspectives of earnings management, which are efficient contracting 
and opportunistic.  Both perspectives aim to give signal to investor, with the 
expectation to obtain positive response that affects the increase of market response 
that will increase share return. If earnings management is done with opportunistic 
purpose, presented earnings aim to hide the bad of real management’s performance. 
For advanced and rational investors, the real performance of a company will be 
easily known by seeing the information presented by other companies in similar 
industry. However, in stock market, there are types and characteristics of investors 
that are varied, not all investors are advanced and rational.  Heterogeneity of 
investors will produce various responses toward disclosed accounting information.  
 Relationship of Earnings Management and Earnings Quality before and after IFRS 
Implementation in Indonesia     
 76  
 
Although there is heterogeneity of investors in stock market, disclosed earnings is 
not the real information, so the information will negatively affects earnings quality.  
Therefore, the hypothesis of the study is formulated as the following:  
 
H2:  Earnings management negatively affects earnings quality before and after 
IFRS implementation. 
  
2.8 Earnings Quality Before and After IFRS Implementation  
 
Criteria of IFRS implementation will relate to financial report making that must be 
done based on principles-based, fair value, and full disclosure.  If accounting 
information includes earnings information resulted from accounting process by 
focusing and emphasizing on disclosure and measurement on assets, liability, and 
equity based on principles-based and fair value, the information presented by 
corporate management is information that can be reliable, because it is reported in 
accordance with the real and relevant condition.  If accounting information is 
presented in financial report containing all disclosures needed, the information is 
transparent information, so it can reduce information asymmetry that misleads users. 
Therefore, accounting information presented will contain qualified earnings 
information that is responded positively by users, including investors and potential 
investors. Rational investors will be interested on corporate performance in the 
future by looking at present earnings information to conduct revision of the 
possibility performance prediction in the future. Based on the explanation, the 
hypothesis of the study is formulated as the following:  
 
H3: Earnings quality of company after IFRS implementation is higher than before 
IFRS implementation.  
 
3. Research Methodology 
   
Sample used in this study is companies listed on IDX in 2009 to 2011 and from 2013 
to 2015 to examine the relationship of earnings management and earnings quality, 
and to see the difference of management intensity in conducting earnings 
management and earnings quality between the ones before and the ones after IFRS 
implementation.  
  
 The study uses discretionary accrual as the measurement of earnings management 
that is detected by using Jones model modification (Dechow et al., 1995).  
According to Thomas and Zhang (2000), modification of Jones model is the best 
model to detect earnings management if it is compared to other models.  Jones 
model modification is better in detecting earnings management because it is adjusted 
with extreme financial performance and can overcome the problem of measurement 
error that might appear when a manager uses discretion in earnings disclosure.  
Detection of the presence or the absence of earnings management is done with the 
steps as the following:   
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Calculating Total Accrual:   
 TAit  =  NIit  –  CFOit                                                                                                  (1) 
Information:  
TAit     = Total Accrual for company i in period t   
NIit      =  Net Income before unusual post of company i in period t  
CFOit =  Operation activation cashflow of company i in period t   
Calculating Discretionary Accruals:   
a. The step done is regressing Total Accrual, with the formulation as the 
following:   
 TAit /Ait-1  =  α (1/Ait-1 ) + β1 (ΔREVit  /Ait-1 ) + β2 (PPEit /Ait-1 ) + εit                  (2) 
b. The next step is calculating Nondiscretionary Accrual (NDA) with the 
formulation as the following:  
 NDA it    =   α (1/Ait-1) + β1 (ΔREVit /Ait-1 - ΔRECit /Ait-1) +  β2 (PPEit /Ait-1)       (3) 
c. The next step is calculating discretionary accrual by reducing the amount of 
Total Accrual with Nondiscretionary Accrual that is deflated by total asset. 
The formulation used is:  
 DA it   =   TA it  /A it -1 – NDA it                                                                              (4) 
ΔREVit      = Revenue of company i in period t reduced by revenue of period 
t-1  
ΔRECit      = Net Receivables of company i in end of period t reduced by net 
receivable in end of period t-1   
PPEit           = Property, Plant and Equipment of company i in end of period t-1 
Ait-1             = Total Asset of company i in end of period t-1 
DA it            = Discretionary Accrual of company i in end of period t 
NDA it     = Nondiscretionary Accrual of company i in end of year t 
To determine values of α,  β1, and β2 , it uses ordinary least squares (OLS). 
 
3.1 Measurement of Variable Earnings Quality  
 
Earnings quality is proxied with earnings persistence measured by regression slope 
on the difference of current earnings with previous earnings (α). The formula used is 
the formula proposed by Dechow et al. (2010), as the following:  
X it =α + β X it-1 + ε                                                                                       (5) 
X it      = earnings of company i year t  
X it-1     = earnings of company i year t-1  
 
3.2 Hypothesis Testing and Research Model  
 
The testing of hypotheses H1 and H3 uses compare mean independent sample t test, 
to examine the difference of management intensity in conducting the action of 
earnings management and the difference of earnings quality before and after IFRS 
implementation.  The testing of hypothesis H2 of the study uses multiple linear 
regressions–ordinary least square (OLS) by adding control variables of firm size 
(measured by total assets) and leverage level (measured by debt ratio).  Analysis 
model of this study is formulated as the following:  
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Pers = a + b11 Earn + b12 Size + b13 Lev + e1i                                                (6) 
Pers = Earning Persistence, is a proxy from earnings quality that is 
calculated by regression slop on the difference of current earnings 
and previous earnings  (α).  
Earn =   Earnings Management, that is proxied with discretionary accrual, 
that is calculated using modification of Jones model.  
Size  =   Firm Size, that is measured by total assets.  
Lev   =   Leverage Level, that is measured by corporate debt ratio.  
 
4. Research Result and Discussion  
 
The testing on H1 demonstrates the result that all companies listed on IDX conduct 
earnings management both before and after IFRS implementation.  However, 
management intensity in conducting earnings management is higher if it is compared 
to the one after IFRS implementation, by seeing the amount of discretionary accrual.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that IFRS implementation is able to reduce corporate 
management intensity in conducting earnings management. The result of this study 
is in accordance with the rationale that IFRS implementation will limit the space for 
management to conduct opportunistic action, for example conducting earnings 
management.  It occurs because of the use of principles-based, fair value, and the 
must of management to conduct full disclosure.  
 
Hypothesis testing of H2 produces the evidence that earnings management done 
after IFRS implementation affects earnings quality that is proxied by earnings 
persistence.  Some researchers also concluded that there is effect relationship 
between earnings management and earnings quality.  Earnings announced by 
company that conducts earnings management sometimes obtain strong market 
reaction. It shows that not all investors are advanced and rational investors. Some 
investors who are naive and irrational who do not realize that the announced 
earnings are the result from earnings management action.   
 
The rationale used in this study is that earnings resulted from earnings management 
action will reduce earnings quality.  Regarding to the needs of stock market, 
qualified financial information (including earnings information) is needed as the 
base of decision making for investors.  Therefore, management is responsible on 
information provision that is punctual, relevant, reliable, complete, and easy to be 
understood, so it reduces information asymmetry.  Thus, information users will be 
able to observe and supervise performance and prospect of company entirely.  
 
The hypothesis testing of H3 found the evidence that earnings quality of company 
after IFRS implementation is higher if it is compared to the earnings quality before 
IFRS implementation. The rationale of this study is that earnings management, both 
done with the purpose of efficient contracting and opportunistic will be responded 
negatively by investors and potential investors, that will reduce quality of earnings 
announced in stock market.  Regarding to the financial report making, IFRS 
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implementation will reduce management intensity in conducting earnings 
management.  It is caused using principles-based, fair value, and full disclosure, as 
the base of financial report making.  Therefore, information presented by 
management after IFRS implementation is more qualified information because it is 
more reliable, and more relevant because it is reported in accordance with the real 
condition of the company.  
  
The testing result on control variables of firm size (Size), and leverage level (Lev) 
shows that the result is not significant.  It means that firm size and leverage level of 
company do not affect earnings quality.  The testing result can be meant that 
information about firm size and leverage level of company is not important and not 
responded by market that does not affect earnings quality. 
  
5. Conclusion 
 
This study can find evidence that IFRS implementation is able to reduce 
management intensity of company in conducting earnings management.  The result 
of this study is in accordance with the rationale that IFRS implementation will limit 
the space for management to conduct opportunistic action, for example by 
conducting earnings management.  Earnings management done after IFRS 
implementation negatively affects earnings quality that is proxied by earnings 
persistence.  This study also found the evidence that earnings quality of company 
after IFRS implementation is higher if it is compared to the earnings quality before 
IFRS implementation. Those findings are in accordance with the rationale that 
earnings resulted from earnings management action, both conducted with the 
purpose of efficient contracting and opportunistic will be responded negatively by 
investors and potential investor that will reduce earnings quality announced in stock 
market.  
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